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Abstract
According to the osetting eect theory, since drivers wearing seat belts feel more
secure, they tend to drive less carefully and may cause more accidents, including
those involving pedestrians. Most previous studies have used only state-level accident
data, which cannot control for individual characteristics of drivers, vehicles, and the
environmental factors surrounding the accidents. This paper uses individual-level
accident data to analyze how drivers respond to the laws exploiting changes in the
seat belt laws in a number of US states in the last decade. I nd that the laws do not
cause less careful behavior by drivers. In fact, they drive more carefully when more
stringent seat belt laws are in eect, and this leads to less involvement of pedestrians
in accidents. These results show that the osetting eects do not exist when all
accidents, including fatal accidents, are considered.
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I. Introduction
It is widely accepted that mandatory seat belt laws reduce the fatalities of drivers who wear
seat belts. However, there have been ongoing discussions regarding the eectiveness of the laws.
According to the osetting eect theory, suggested by Peltzman (1975), since drivers wearing seat
belts feel more secure, they drive less carefully, causing more fatal accidents involving pedestrians.
If the laws resulted in more pedestrian involvement in accidents and the resulting fatalities were
sizeable enough to oset the decrease in the fatalities of drivers and passengers, then the seat belt
regulation would be considered ineective. This paper reinvestigates the existence of the eects.
Many earlier studies have only investigated the eects of the seat belt laws on the fatality
rates of drivers and passengers. Some have directly tested the eectiveness of the seat belt laws
on the fatalities of the non-occupants who are involved in fatal accidents. These tests show
mixed results. Furthermore, even some supporting results do not provide direct evidence on
the relationship between the laws and the osetting behavior, even though many factors are
appropriately controlled for in their models. This is mainly because most literature uses only
either aggregated state-level or survey data.
Several problems may arise from using state-level data for this type of research. First,
the state-level data cannot correctly measure heterogeneity among drivers and their behavioral
change. By focusing on the causal relationship between the laws and the fatality at the state
level, researchers failed to gure out if the laws caused drivers' adverse behavior, and in turn,
if it led to the frequent involvement of non-occupants in accidents. Another issue is that most
literature focuses only on fatality rates because of data limit. The overall eects of a regulation
on safety should include both the monetary value of injuries and fatalities. In other words, the
reduction of accidental harm should include the magnitude of less severe injuries of occupants
and non-occupants because of the laws. Therefore, we can still conclude that the overall eect of
the primary seat belt laws on accidental harm is ambiguous.
This paper answers three major questions. First, would seat belt laws cause drivers' more
aggressive and/or less careful driving behavior? By looking at individual accident data with
the specic locations of crashes, I investigate if there is a direct link between the laws and the
behavioral change. Second, would less careful driving behavior, if the eects existed, result in
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the involvement of more pedestrians and other non-occupants in accidents? Third, how does the
less careful driving behavior play a role as a link between the laws and the involvement of non-
occupants? To answer these questions, this paper develops a unique model of identifying drivers'
behavioral changes by observing each individual driver's responses to the change in the laws.
I nd that the laws do not cause less careful behavior by drivers. In fact, they drive
more carefully when more stringent seat belt laws are in eect, and this leads to less pedestrian
involvement in accidents. These results show that the osetting eects do not exist when all
accidents, including fatal accidents, are considered. As a policy implication, I recommend the
use of stronger punitive penalties along with the seat belt laws. This policy tool can be used
to increase the expected monetary costs of not wearing seat belts so that it induces less careful
drivers to wear them.
The paper consists of ve sections. In the next section, I review the literature on osetting
behavior. Section III discusses the empirical strategy and the econometric models. Section IV
describes data. Section V discusses estimation results as well as sample selection, endogeneity,
and sensitivity analysis. The last section draws conclusions and policy implications.
II. Literature
It is widely accepted that seat belt usage reduces fatalities among those wearing seat belts.
According to the 2008 survey from the National Highway Trac Safety Administration (NHTSA),
seat belt usage has risen steadily, while there has been a steady decline in passenger vehicle
occupant fatalities per mile traveled1. Most economic literature has focused on whether the seat
belt laws have reduced aggregate fatalities or not, regardless of the type of individuals involved in
accidents. Many papers (McCarthy (1999), Derrig et al. (2002)) use time series data and analyze
whether there is any statistically signicant dierence before and after the law enforcement.
However, such studies neglect to control for a time trend, and since macro eects unrelated to
seat belt laws also aect fatalities, this is an important limitation of these studies. The tests (with
mixed results) for osetting eects are only considered as a secondary concern to those who focus
1NHTSA: Trac Safety Facts - Laws, 2008.
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on aggregate fatality.
Other studies try to investigate directly if the osetting eect in fact exists2. Among
others, Garbacz(1990) nds a positive relationship between seat belt usage and fatality of non-
occupants. Recent studies use panel data models using state level data. Evan and Graham (1991)
use pooled data from 50 states. They nd that there is weak evidence that fatalities of non-
occupants increase and they conclude that osetting behavior appears to be small, relative to
lifesaving eects. Cohen and Einav(2003) investigate it by looking at the eects of the laws on
the fatalities of non-occupants. They notice a potential endogeneity problem of seat belt usage
and use seat belt laws as an instrument for it. They do not nd any signicant evidence on
the compensating behavior. These studies focus on the factors that aect fatalities and use the
increase in the fatality rate as evidence of osetting behavior, which could not be direct evidence
of the behavioral change.
Some of the empirical studies focus on an individual's personal characteristics. They nd
that heterogeneity across individuals is important. Loeb (1995) uses monthly accident data in
only one state to remove the state-wide dierences in the laws. He nds that the state's seat belt
law results in a reduction in the various driver-involved injury rates. However, as long as they use
aggregate data, in particular, state-level data, many problems still persist. After controlling for
state-specic characteristics, they could easily nd whether the laws in dierent states reduced
fatalities, given a xed number of fatalities. However, it is very dicult to observe an individual
driver's behavioral change and test if this behavioral change aects fatalities using the state-level
data. Furthermore, there is no direct link between behavioral change and the laws. State-level
data obtained from surveys is subject to serious measurement error concerns and unobserved
hetereogeneity given the lack of control of individual-level characteristics regarding the driver, the
vehicle, and the environmental conditions surrounding the accidents.
Sobel and Nesbit (2007) use individual-level data to test for individual human responses
to safety improvements within a well-controlled environment. They use data from the National
Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR). Their results strongly support the presence
of these osetting behavioral eects. Since those drivers are always driving at the limit of what
2Earlier studies include Peltzman (1975, 1977), Robertson (1977), Crandall and Graham (1984), Gar-
bacz(1990), Evans and Graham (1991), and Loeb (1995).
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is safe, it is expected that the authors would nd a clear osetting eect. Professional racecar
drivers on a closed course, participating in a competition in which the objective is to beat all
other drivers, are certainly not representative of average drivers on our roads.
Many studies only used data from fatal crashes. The use of only fatal crashes may not
accurately measure the eectiveness of a safety regulation and it may result in sample selection
bias. Some (Levitt et al. (2001)) have proposed a solution to remove this bias by including only
crashes in which someone in a dierent vehicle dies.
Singh and Thayer (1992) use models based on individual-specic survey data to see if seat
belt usage aects the number of citations for moving violations. Their results show that the
compensating behavior hypothesis only applies to those individuals who are not strongly averse
to risk, and that individual risk preferences are an important dimension. They nd that drivers'
risk preferences may be irrelevant to the behavioral change. They also nd that the existence of
the osetting behavior may not necessarily result in the increase in non-occupant involvement.
My paper does not investigate the eects of seat belt laws on trac fatalities. The question
to be answered is whether I can identify the direct link between the behavioral change due to the
laws and accidental harm, including fatalities. For this, I use individual-level accident data over
a ve-year period from the National Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA)3.
III. Empirical Strategy and Econometric Models
There are two types of law enforcement. One is primary enforcement in which occupants can be
ticketed simply for not using their seat belts. The other is secondary enforcement under which
occupants must be stopped for another violation, such as a speeding violation, before they can
be cited for seat belt nonuse4. Thus, the primary enforcement is a much stronger regulatory tool.
As of 2010, 32 states had primary seat belt laws in eect (Table 1)5. I use this information to
see if stronger law enforcement causes careless driving behavior and then if the behavior, if any,
3The detailed description of the data is discussed in section V.
4NHTSA, \Trac Safety Use in 2008", DOT HS 811 036.
5Even though many states adopt primary seat belt laws, the coverage and the maximum fee dier from
state to state. For instance, Texas charges $ 200, while many states charge only $ 10.
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results in more involvement of pedestrians.
The estimation strategy consists of two steps. First, I observe each accident that occurred
between 2003 and 2007. Since the year 2003, 13 states have changed their seat belt laws from
secondary to primary, so I will focus on the accidents that occurred in these states. Within a
state, accidents occur either before (pre-accidents) or after (post-accidents) the enforcement date
of the primary seat belt law. I test if there are behavioral dierences among drivers who have
accidents before and after the date. Each observation is a driver who is involved in an accident.
It contains a variable, a zip-code, that shows the location of the driver's home address 6. It also
shows when the accident occurred. The observation tells us whether or not the accident occurs
under the primary seat belt law. Since accidents occur on dierent dates within a state as well as
across the states, some occur before the primary seat belt laws are adopted, while others occur
after them. I use drivers' careless behavior to measure the behavioral dierence before and after
the enforcement date of the seat belt laws. Each observation shows whether or not the driver was
less careful at the time of crash. Careless behavior includes talking on, listening to, or dialing a
phone; adjusting climate control, the radio, or a CD; using other devices integral to the vehicle;
sleeping, eating or drinking; smoking related distractions; and other distractions or inattention7.
Second, I test if more non-occupants are involved in accidents as the result of less careful
driving when the primary seat belt laws are in force 8. If the less careful driving behavior does
not result from the stronger seat belt laws, then we can conclude that the laws are not one of the
determinants of any involvement of non-occupants in accidents.
These two may be correlated. If drivers feel secure because of the seat belt laws, they may
drive less carefully by taking some careless actions, which, in turn, may result in greater probability
of causing accidents involving more non-occupants. Because this recursive relationship between
6Some drivers cause accidents in other states rather than their states. They are travelers and commuters.
However, the data set does not include information on the exact locations of crashes. There is no reason
to believe that most drivers experience accidents in other states rather than their states. Thus, drivers'
addresses are used.
7Less careful driving may appear in many dierent forms. Either drivers raise their travel speed above
the maximum speed limit or they show specic careless behavior. They can be used as indicators showing
their behavioral change. Other forms can be illustrated by sleeping, being drowsy, less focus on driving,
etc. I use the denition of careless behavior from the NHTSA.
8Previous literature investigates whether seat belt laws reduce the number of fatal accidents. This paper
only focus on behavioral change, conditional on the accidents that are occurred. The GES data contain a
sample randomly selected from the population, but it includes all types of injuries, unlike the FAR data,
which includes only fatal accidents. Therefore, accidental harm is measured only by injury levels.
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laws, driving behavior, and the involvement of non-occupants results in simultaneity, separate
estimation could cause biases, and the pooled bivariate probit model is a natural specication to
employ9. Since this model is qualitatively dierent from the typical bivariate probit model, it is
a recursive, simultaneous-equations model10.
The bivariate probit model is
ymi = 
0
ixmi + iy

li + mi, ymi = 1 if y

mi > 0,
= 0 otherwise,
E[m] = E[l] = 0, 8 m 6= l,
V ar[m] = V ar[l] = 1, 8 m 6= l,
Cov[m; l] = , 8 m 6= l.
The bivariate normal cdf, (x1; x2; ), is
Prob(X1 < x1; X2 < x2) =
Z x2
 1
Z x1
 1
n(z1; z2; )dz1dz2.
, where m = 1 and 2.
Assume that "1 and "2 are joint normally distributed with means zero, and covariance
matrix, . In summary, the recursive system is:
9A panel data model is an ideal model for this research. However, it is not possible to construct panel
data from the GES data set. The data set is basically repeated cross-sectional. Recent economic literature
has developed an econometric technique (Synthetic (or Pseudo) panel data model) that produces panel
data from cross-sectional data. As a sensitivity analysis, I construct a synthetic panel data model to see if
its estimation results are consistent with this probit model. The estimation results are presented in section
V. For more details, see Bae & Bentez-Silva (2011a).
10See Green (2003) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) for more details.
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Bi = f(Li; Xi; Xt; Xs)
Ii = f(Bi; Xi; Xt; Xs)
(1)
where, Li = primary seat belt law, Bi = driver's carelessness, Ii = involvement of non-
occupants, Xi = exogenous independent variables, Xt and Xs = year- and state-xed eects.
Control variables (Xi) on the right-hand side include personal characteristics, vehicle fac-
tors, road and weather conditions, and other environmental factors. Therefore, if two accidents
occur on the same date in the same state, then the behavioral dierences between two drivers
would only be explained by these control variables (Xi). They are in both equations. Furthermore,
the model includes year and state dummies to control for aggregate year and state impacts. To
compare the estimation outcomes, both separate probit and bivariate probit models are presented
and discussed.
The sample for the analysis contains states. Therefore, the dependent variable might be
correlated within a cluster (a state), possibly through unobserved cluster eects (Wooldridge,
2002). This is true even when some control variables are included, so I use the standard errors
that allow for within-state correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that the observations be
independent. All the t-values are calculated using a robust variance estimate that adjusts for
within-cluster correlation.
Various post-estimation issues, such as sample selection, endogeneity, identication, etc,
are discussed in section V. The estimation results from a synthetic (Pseudo) panel data model
are also presented as a robust test.
IV. Data and Summary Statistics
1. Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use two sources of data. The rst source of data is about the seat belt laws. As of 2008,
all US jurisdictions except New Hampshire adopted seat belt legislation. Many states, such as
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Connecticut, New York, and Texas, adopted primary seat belt laws in the mid-1980s, while some
states, such as Kansas, adopted it recently (Table 1). The coverage of seat belt use diers from
state to state. Due to changes in law enforcement, seat belt use has increased consistently over
time. It reached 83 percent in 200811. However, many states still adopt secondary seat belt laws.
The second source of data is about accidents. It is obtained from the National Highway
Trac Safety Administration (NHTSA). The General Estimates System (GES) in the NHTSA
obtains its data from a nationally representative probability sample selected from the estimated
six million police-reported crashes that occur annually. This data contains the detailed description
of each crash. Each crash includes information on the people and vehicles involved as well as the
detailed description of the accident, including environmental factors12.
There are several advantages of using this data. First, it contains detailed information
on individual drivers' behavior, such as careless driving behavior, alcohol consumption, non-
occupant involvement and other behavioral change at the time of the crash, before the crash and
after the crash so that I can observe each driver's detailed behavior. Second, it contains vehicle
characteristics, such as model year, age of car, and vehicle contribution factor. Previous literature
shows that the vehicle age aects drivers' behavior (Crandall & Graham (1984)). For instance, I
identify what model year vehicles were involved in a particular accident. Third, each observation
has a zip code so that I know in which state the accident occurred at that particular time. The zip
code for each observation is the main link between the seat belt law in the state and the accident.
Furthermore, this data set includes environmental factors, road conditions, weather conditions,
and personal characteristics. These characteristics are unique to each observation. They are used
as control variables to account for individual (crash-specic) heterogeneity. For instance, suppose
that two crashes occur in the same state on a same date. The characteristics explain the variations
among them. By controlling for these factors, I can see the eects of primary seat belt laws on
drivers' behavior. Otherwise, the coecient of the seat belt law would be biased because of the
heterogeneity aecting the behavior, even though I control for state-xed and year-xed eects.
11Click It or Ticket (CIOT), America's Seat Belt Campaign, NHTSA.
12Since the GES contains a sample from all accidents, one cannot use this data to see the eects of
seat belt laws on fatalities. However, this also contains accidents with no, or minor injuries as well as
fatal injuries. This enables us to see if the laws result in more or less severe accidents, conditional on
the accidents that have occurred. Since the GES data contains only accidents, the reduction in accidental
harm can be measured by only the reduction of the severity of injuries. The overall benets should include
\no accident", which is unobservable.
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Since I focus on the states that have changed their seat belt laws since 2003, I only use
accidents that occurred in these states13. Over the time period, more than 76,000 people were
involved in crashes in these states (Table 2). Drivers consist of 78 percent of them (59,528
individuals). Since non-occupants do not aect drivers' behavioral change due to the laws, I only
use the observations for drivers.
One thing to consider is whether the increase in accidental harm from the osetting behav-
ior is big enough to outweigh the reduction in accidental harm from the seat belt laws, even if the
osetting behavior exists. By simply taking a look at the descriptive statistics of accident data,
one could nd some intuitive idea on the size of accidental harm of non-occupants. The General
Estimates System (GES) has 76,481 individuals who were involved in the accidents that occurred
in these states over the period of study14. Pedestrians and cyclists consisted of only 1.72 percent
of them (Table 2). Drivers and passengers consisted of 98.03 percent of the sample. Therefore,
it may not be sizeable, even if the fatality of non-occupants increases because of the osetting
eects. This becomes clear when I focus on the injury severity levels of those non-occupants
included in the sample. Among the 1,309 non-occupants involved in accidents over the period,
only 80 people had a fatal injury (Table 3). Fifty-ve percent of them actually caused the acci-
dents due to their possible mistakes or misbehavior (Table 4). If we include non-motorist vehicle
operators and other or unknown action, the percentage increases to 81.25 percent. Only 18.75
percent of them (or 15 non-occupants out of more than 76,000 people involved in accidents) had
a fatal injury when they did not take any action. This percentage can be explained by drivers'
mistakes or careless (or even intentionally aggressive) behavior. Even so, there is no guarantee
that the seat belt laws cause this involvement.
2. Summary Statistics
Table 5 shows summary statistics for the main model. Dependent variables are dummy variables.
The dependent variable in the rst equation, CARELESS, measures whether the driver was
distracted at the time of the accident. This behavior is caused by the driver, not by other
13In 2010, Kansas changed the law, but I do not use the information because the GES data for the year
was pre-estimated one.
14There was no change in the laws in 2008. In 2009, 4 states changed their laws. By including these four
states, we can compare drivers' behavioral dierences between the states with and without the primary
seat belt law over the years of study.
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people or objects on the road. Therefore, it directly measures the driver's mistakes or careless
behavior. If the driver in an accident is careless, then the value is 1. Otherwise, the value is
zero. Careless behavior includes the driver's talking on, listening to, or dialing a phone; adjusting
climate control, the radio, or a CD; eating or drinking; smoking-related distractions; using or
reaching other devices integral to the vehicle; sleeping; and other distractions or inattention15.
More than 13 percent of the drivers were careless when accidents occurred. The dependent variable
in the second equation, NON OCCUPANTS, measures the involvement of non-occupants, such
as pedestrians and bikers, in the accident. If any non-occupant is involved in the accident, then
the value is one. Otherwise, the value is zero. About 5.3 percent of the drivers experienced
non-occupant related accidents.
Independent variables include three main factors: individual accident-level, state-xed,
and year-xed factors along with the seat belt law16. The main variable, PRIMARY , is an
indicator. If an accident occurs before the enforcement date in the state, then the value is zero.
Otherwise, it is one. More than 45 percent of accidents occurred when the primary seat belt
laws were in force. To see drivers' lagged adjustment, I dene another variable. The variable,
PRIMARY 3, has the value of zero if the accident occurs before the enforcement date or within
the rst 3 months since the adoption of the new law. About 3.2 percent of drivers had accidents
within the periods, so the variable, PRIMARY , has the value of 1 for these observations, but it
is 0 in PRIMARY 3. The variable, PRIMARY 6, allows three more months.
The drivers' average age is 38 and 61 percent of the drivers in the sample are males.
ALCOHOL measures whether alcohol is involved in the accident at the time of the crash. If
alcohol is involved, then the value is 1, otherwise it is 0. Slightly more than 10 percent of
accidents were related to alcohol. NIGHT measures when the accident occurs. If the accident
occurs between 7:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., then the value is one. Otherwise, the value is zero.
About 21 percent of the accidents occurred at night time. The variable is correlated with alcohol
consumption, which may cause careless behavior. HIGH POP is a dummy variable that indicates
the density of population. If the accident occurs in the area with 100,000 residents or more, then
15Some drivers were distracted by other occupants or outside person or object at the time of crashes.
However, this type of distraction could have been avoided if they had been attentive. Notice that this is
self-reported by the driver, or occupants, and in some cases by witnesses to the accidents
16The denition and the description of each variable is in the appendix.
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it is one. Otherwise, it is zero 17. I expect that drivers are more careful in driving in highly
populated areas.
Many variables that reect road and weather conditions are included. If the road surface
is dry, then DRY SURFACE is one. If it is wet, snowy, or icy, then it is zero. The variable mea-
sures road conditions. About 80 percent of drivers had accidents under good surface conditions.
GOOD WEATHER measures if it is rainy, snowy, sleety, and foggy. If there is no adverse con-
dition, then the value is one. LIGHT measures visual conditions. Sixty-ve percent of accidents
occurred during the daylight. I also include the vintage variable, V EHICLE AGE, to measure
drivers' behavioral dierences, depending on how old their vehicles are. The average vehicle age is
7.2 years. To account for a possible non-linear relationship, I also include V EHICLE AGE SQ.
If the accident occurs on the highway, then the variable, HIGHWAY , has the value of one. Most
accidents occurred on local roads. If the accident occurs in an interchange area, then the value of
INTERCHANGE is one. Otherwise, it is zero. Less than 3 percent of the accidents occurred
in interchange areas. The variable, SPEED LIMIT , measures the maximum speed limit at the
place of the accident. Since there are dierent maximum speed limits even within a state, this
information helps determine accident-specic variations. The average speed limit is 41 mph18.
State and year dummies are included in the equations to control for state- and year-
xed factors. The states that changed their laws are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin. Florida has the most accidents over the time period. North Carolina and Tennessee
have the second and the third most accident, respectively. Alaska has the fewest accidents among
the states19.
17The reason that the dummy variable is used is because of data limitations. Furthermore, since each
observation has the zip code that the owner of the vehicle resides, the owner's address and the place the
accident occurred will be dierent. Thus, county-level population cannot be used in this case. To control
for regional population density, the dummy variable would be ne.
18Some accidents, not many, occurred in places where the maximum speed limits were zeros. These
places do not have any statutory limit because they are parking lots, alley, or etc.
19The GES data is a sampled data from the police accident reports. Therefore, each selected observation
has its own weight to be used to get the national estimate. The frequencies in the sample do not have
any meaning if the weight is not taken into account. However, it suces to use the raw data to see the
behavioral dierences among drivers because I do calculate neither the number of accidents nor fatality
rates.
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V. Empirical Results
1. Main Estimation Results
The main estimation results are presented in Table 6. The variance-covariance matrix of the
cross-equation error terms is estimated and the null hypothesis that 12 = 0 is tested with a Wald
test at the 5 percent level. The Wald test shows that there is a correlation between the error
terms (Ho :  = 0, 
2(1) = 12:0355). Thus, if two equations were estimated separately, then the
estimated coecients would be inecient. Therefore, the model shows that the involvement of
non-occupants is linked to the primary seat belt laws through the careless behavior of drivers.
All estimation results are obtained using robust standard errors that adjust for within-cluster
correlation. To compare estimation coecients, I present both separate probit and bivariate
probit models.
I focus on the bivariate probit model in the third column, while I present the rst two
models just for comparison. The rst equation tests if the primary seat belt laws induce drivers
to drive less carefully, while the second equation tests if careless driving behavior causes more
accidents involving non-occupants.
The estimation results show that drivers drive more carefully when the primary seat belt
law is in force in a state. Careless behavior is negatively associated with PRIMARY and it is
statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. This is the opposite result of the osetting eect
theory. Primary seat belt law and seat belt usage are highly correlated (NHTSA). Therefore,
more drivers wear their seat belts in the states where stronger law enforcement is in eect. Using
their seat belts may remind drivers to be more careful. We do not know whether drivers feel
more secure by wearing their seat belts. They drive more carefully under the primary seat belt
law. The adoption of the primary seat belt law may warn drivers to be alert for accidents in
their state. Considering that the sample contains only accidents reported to the police, drivers
are more careful because of the law, even though they are involved in accidents. In that sense,
the laws must have played not only a passive protective role but also an active preventive role.
Given that accidents occurred, the primary seat belt laws may reduce the severity of injuries that
otherwise would have been more severe because of their less careful driving behavior20.
20I cannot directly compare the severity levels among the accidents that are reported to the police and
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Among other control variables, careless behavior is caused by neither age nor gender21.
ALCOHOL is not associated with CARELESS, so alcohol involvement itself does not result
in careless behavior22. Careless behavior is found in the accidents that occurred between 7:00
p.m. and 2:00 a.m. Drivers are more careful when the areas are highly populated. During the
daylight, drivers are less careful. When it is dark, dawn or dusk, people drive more carefully.
The vehicle age does not aect a driver's behavior. Therefore, I can conclude that there is no
vintage eect. HIGHWAY is negatively associated with careless behavior. When drivers drive
on highways, they are more careful. A higher speed limit makes drivers less careful. This is a
seemingly counterintuitive outcome. Drivers are possibly more careful on the local roads because
of frequent obstacles, such as pedestrians. Drivers may focus on driving when the roads have
lower maximum speed limits. The coecients of year dummies are not statistically signicant.
Most state dummies are statistically signicant. The estimation outcome from Probit model 1 in
the rst column is not quite dierent from the bivariate probit model in the third column.
The second equation in the third column shows that more careful driving, aected by
the primary seat belt laws, reduces the probability of non-occupant involvement. The coecient
of CARELESS is statistically signicant at the 5 percent signicance level. Thus, in general
when drivers are less careful in driving, more pedestrians are involved in accidents. However,
the seat belt laws make drivers more careful, and thus, there are fewer accidents involving non-
occupants. That means that the osetting eects do not appear here, so I draw a conclusion: The
osetting eects do not exist when the police accident report is used for the analysis. The law
actually reduces non-occupant involvement. The coecient of CARELESS in the second column
is not statistically signicant at any level, so if the second equation is independently estimated,
then the result shows that careless driving behavior is not associated with the involvement of
non-occupants. This is misleading because the model disregards the recursive structure of the
model. There are no substantial dierences between the second and the third models, except
that are not because of the nature of data.
21Most literature show that young male drivers cause more fatal accidents. My study uses individual-
level accident data. It includes the accidents with all injury levels and property damages. Therefore, based
on the police-reported accidents, the estimation results show that there is no dierence in careless behavior
among male and female drivers as well as young and old drivers.
22This result seems odd. However, it is because of the denition of the variable, ALCOHOL. It
measures whether alcohol is involved in an accident. Therefore, it is dierent from the driver's actual
drinking. ALCOHOL measures more likelihood of the accident, while the driver's drinking behavior is
reected in CARELESS.
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CARELESS.
The personal characteristics aect the involvement of non-occupants. Both older and male
drivers cause more accidents involving non-occupants. Alcohol-related accidents involve more
pedestrians. NIGHT is not associated with pedestrian involvement. This makes sense because
not many pedestrians are on the roads during the night. More pedestrians are involved in accidents
in highly populated areas. V INTAGE is irrelevant to the dependent variable again. It is also
natural to observe that HIGHWAY is not statistically associated with NON OCCUPANT
since pedestrians are not on the highway. The coecient, INTERCHANGE, is negative and it
is statistically signicant at the 10 percent level. That means fewer pedestrians are involved in
the accidents occurred in the interchange areas. This is because most drivers are more careful
when they approach the interchange areas. A higher speed limit is associated with less pedestrian
involvement and it is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. This implies that most
accidents involving pedestrians occur on the roads with lower maximum speed limits, such as
local roads. All the year-dummies are not statistically signicant, while most state-dummies are
statistically signicant at either the 1 percent or the 5 percent signicance level. The primary seat
belt laws reduce the accidents involving non-occupants by aecting drivers' driving behavior23.
2. Sample Selection Bias and Endogeneity
In this sub-section, I discuss and answer two potential problems. First, there could be a
sample selection bias in my model. Since the sample contains only the accidents that are reported
to the police, some accidents with minor or no injury or property damage only are not in the
sample. This might cause a sample selection problem. Assuming that the drivers who report to
the police are, on average, more likely to be less careful, could it be that accidents are more likely
when they aren't wearing their seat belts? Maybe (because of osetting behavior), the accidents
are more likely. I am not able to control for selection, using the traditional way (following Heckman
(1979)), because I do not have information on those who do not report accidents. Therefore, to
see if this sample selection problem, if any, alters my estimation results, I use an alternative
method. I estimate the model using sub-samples. The GES data has information on vehicle role
23The marginal eects for a conditional mean function in the bivariate probit model are not reported in
this paper. It is available to the author upon request.
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in accidents. Many accidents involve multi-vehicle crashes. Each driver (each observation) is in
either a striking or non-striking vehicle. Striking vehicles may be associated with drivers' careless
behavior. However, struck vehicles are irrelevant to the careless behavior. Therefore, the drivers
whose vehicles are struck are not necessarily associated with careless behavior. They would not
have been reported to the police if their vehicles had not been involved in accidents.
Therefore, I estimate the model using only these observations. That way, the estimation
results can ameliorate the sample selection bias concerns, if the sample includes only struck
vehicles24. The estimation results will show both samples to compare. If the estimation results
were quite dierent among two specications, then this would be the indirect evidence of serious
selection bias.
Table 7 shows the estimation results to detect any possible sample selection problem. I
divide the sample into two sub-samples: Striking vehicle group vs. Non-striking vehicle group. We
may consider the striking vehicle group relatively less careful (more risky) than the non-striking
group. As the results show, the primary seat belt laws make drivers more careful. There is no big
dierence between the two sub-samples. The variable, DRY SURFACE is positively correlated
with CARELESS and is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in the non-striking vehicle
group. However, it is not signicant in the striking vehicle group. This makes sense because
drivers in struck vehicles are less careful when the road condition is good. Other control variables
show similar outcomes. The only dierence is in state dummies. In some states, drivers show
opposite behavior, depending on their vehicle role.
The second equation shows that drivers' careful driving results in less pedestrian involve-
ment and there is no dierence between the two groups. Both sub-samples should be estimated by
the bivariate probit model. Some control variables that were not statistically signicant in Table
6 are now signicant. The variable, AGE, shows dierent behavioral patterns in the two groups.
Older drivers in the striking vehicle group experience more accidents involving non-occupants,
while younger drivers in the non-striking vehicle group experience more accidents involving them-
selves. ALCOHOL is positively associated with NON OCCUPANT only in the striking vehicle
24The information on the vehicle role in the police reports does not identify who caused the accidents.
Struck vehicles may cause the accidents. However, striking vehicles may cause more accidents on average.
In this sense, this method may not be an ideal way to solve the selection bias problem, but an alternative
way to ameliorate it.
16
group. Drivers in struck vehicles are not related to alcohol involvement. The weather does not af-
fect the involvement of non-occupants in the striking vehicle group. However, when the weather is
good, fewer non-occupants are involved in crashes in the non-striking vehicle group. V INTAGE
aects the dependent variable in the non-striking vehicle group, while INTERCHANGE aects
it in the striking vehicle group. Fewer pedestrians are involved in accidents when the road has a
lower speed limit, regardless the vehicle role.
In conclusion, the estimation results do not alter the main estimation results. Furthermore,
the selection bias does not seem serious because both sub-samples show similar outcomes. Some
control variables explain drivers' behavioral dierences in the sub-samples. Still, the primary seat
belt laws reduce the accidents involving non-occupants regardless of the drivers with dierent risk
preference.
The second question that I need to answer in this section is why a state changed the law
during a particular year. The state might have changed the law because of the increase in the
fatality rate over time. If so, then the increase in the fatality rates in previous years may be
the source of more careful driving behavior. If this is true, then a possible endogeneity problem
may arise. As part of the identication strategy, I need to prove that more or less careful driving
behavior should not be caused by the consistent increase or decrease in the fatality rate, but
caused by the seat belt laws. If a primary seat belt law in a state were adopted at one point in
time because of an increase in fatality rates in previous years, then the non-occupant involvement
would be explained by the fatality rates, not by the law itself. As we can see from Table 8, there
is no clear trend in fatality rates. For instance, the state of Mississippi experiences a constant
decrease in the fatality rates until 2006, when the law began being enforced. Then, the fatality
rate reaches the lowest point in 2008. Therefore, the fatality rate is not the source of the law
enforcement, but the result of it.
3. Lagged Eects
Another issue is how quickly drivers adjust their driving behavior to the change in the
law, if they do at all. If the laws do not have an immediate impact on drivers' behavior, the
estimation results may be plagued by measurement error, so I re-estimate the model using another
variable for Li. I consider the accidents that occur within three months (or six months) after the
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enforcement dates as pre-accidents. During the rst three or six months, some drivers may not
know whether their states have changed the laws. Alternatively, it takes time for people to adjust
their driving pattern (or behavior). With the modication of the variable, the model can explain
possible \recursive" correlation between laws, driving behavior, and the resulting involvement of
non-occupants in accidents.
To test if there is a lagged eect, I estimate the model using PRIMARY 3 and PRIMARY 6.
These variables reect drivers' delayed behavioral change due to the change in the law enforce-
ment. The estimation results are shown in Table 925. The rst model uses PRIMARY 3, while
the second model uses PRIMARY 6. The rst model shows almost the same estimation results
with Table 6. Both the coecients, PRIMARY 3 and CARELESS, are statistically signicant
at the 1 percent signicance level. From this result, I can conclude that drivers' behavioral change
may not be immediate. The estimation results still remain unchanged.
Now, the second model uses PRIMARY 6. The coecient of CARELESS in the second
equation is now statistically insignicant at any signicance level. Furthermore, the Wald test
cannot reject the null of lack of correlation between the equations. From this observation, the
eect of the primary seat belt laws on non-occupant involvement is immediate and show some
delayed eects too. However, the eects do not last long and fade out over time.
4. Sensitivity Analysis
Drivers' behavioral change may come from other unobservable factors rather than the
adoption of the primary seat belt laws. Suppose that two accidents occur on a particular date in
a state. Two drivers' behavioral dierences must be captured by other individual factors, such as
their income levels, education levels, attitudes on risk, and others. This identication issue can
be resolved by conducting a sensitivity analysis26.
For the sensitivity analysis, I observe each state and choose a neighboring state where
the primary seat belt law had been enforced before 2003, or where there is no primary law until
now27. Then, I assign each accident to either a pre- or post-accident as if the state changed the
25The year dummies are not shown in the table.
26I conduct this sensitivity analysis because the GES data do not have information on each driver's
personal characteristics, such as income, education, and etc, except gender and age.
27It doesn't matter whether or not the neighboring state has the primary seat belt law. There will be
no behavioral change since there is no change in the law.
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seat belt law on the enforcement date of the neighboring state. Then, I estimate the model using
the bivariate probit model. If this estimation outcome were similar to the main results, then it
would be evidence that other unobservable factors rather than the seat belt laws aected the
behavioral change as well as the involvement of non-occupants.
Table 10 shows the estimation results using only neighboring states. The error terms are
not correlated. Therefore, there is no recursive structure in this model. Two equations should
be separately estimated. The rst model shows that the primary seat belt laws induce drivers'
careless driving behavior, which is an opposite result from Table 6. It is statistically signicant
but at the marginal level. Then, we can conclude that the osetting eects appear in the states
where there is no change in the seat belt laws. How can we explain this seemingly odd result? In
fact, the variable, PRIMARY , in this section represents pre- and post-primary seat belt periods
in the neighboring states where new laws are adopted. Therefore, the drivers in the states with no
legal change may be aected by the states with the legal change. Knowing that the neighboring
state changes the law on a particular date, the drivers whose state does not change its law may
tend to drive less carefully28.
According to a report from the US Department of Tranportation, accidents related to
careless driving behavior have increased between 2005 and 2009. The report says, \The proportion
of fatalities reportedly associated with driver distraction increased from 10 percent in 2005 to 16
percent in 2009. During that time, fatal crashes with reported driver distraction also increased
from 10 percent to 16 percent."(US DOT Report, 2011). This implies that, in general, drivers
have driven less carefully over time. This is probably because of the improved safety quality
of vehicles, and better road conditions over time. Thus, unless there is more stringent safety
regulation, drivers may tend to drive less carefully. This is reected in the coecient of the
variable, PRIMARY . It is positively associated with the seat belt laws. This is because the
model includes only the states where there is no \actual" change in the law29.
28Interstate commuters may change their driving behavior once they cross the border of the states. This
is not empirically proved. However, this is plausible if we consider a similar situation. With regard to
maximum speed limits, drivers reduce their travel speed as they pass from the roads with higher to those
with lower maximum speed limits.
29This implies that the pooled cross-sectional probit model does not eectively control for unobserved
factors that change over time and aect the dependent variable. This gives a rationale for the use of the
panel data model. However, there is no panel data on individual accidents. In the next section, I present
a synthetic panel data model.
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In the second equation, the careless behavior is not associated with the involvement of
non-occupants in accidents. Therefore, the involvement of non-occupants in accidents must be
explained by other factors rather than the primary seat belt laws. This is true because these
neighboring states did not change their laws over the period of study.
The estimation results in Tables 6 and 10 are dierent. When there is no change in the
seat belt law, there is no recursive structure. Thus, I can conclude that the primary seat belt law
is one of the main determinants for the involvement of non-occupants via the change in drivers'
driving behavior.
5. Synthetic Panel Data Model
The bivariate probit model is used as a main model for this research and it is basically a pooled
cross-sectional model. One reason for using independently pooled cross sections is to increase the
sample size and thus get more precise estimators (Wooldridge, 2002). I use it, not for that reason,
but because of the change in the seat belt laws that occurs at dierent points in time. The ideal
estimation strategy is to use panel data. However, it is not possible to have such data at the
individual accident level as I explained in the earlier section. As an alternative, I introduce an
appropriate econometric technique, a synthetic panel data model30.
The synthetic panel model groups drivers into several cohorts according to their personal
characteristics and observes their behavioral changes over time as well as across the cohorts. I
use gender, states, and four age groups to construct cohorts. Each cohort contains drivers whose
characteristics are similar. For instance, one cohort contains drivers who are all males between 16
and 25 years old who all live in the same state. Then, I observe this group's behavior over time.
I also calculate the ratio of careless drivers to all drivers in the cohort. The ratio is used for the
variable, CARELESS. This variable is not an indicator, but a continuous variable that shows
a rate between zero and one. The higher the ratio is, the less careful the drivers on average in
the cohort. From this grouping, 88 dierent cohorts are created31. Since there are ve years, the
30This econometric technique has recently developed and carefully used in the limited settings, depending
on the nature of studies. It is essentially impossible to observe an individual driver's behavior and his or her
response to seat belt laws over time. Thus, the technique groups drivers whose characteristics are similar
into a type. We then track the drivers' behavior over time through these types. So, each type behaves as
if it were an individual. For more details, see Deaton (1985), Deaton & Irish (1985), Verbeek & Nijman
(1992), and, recently, Bae & Bentez-Silva (2011a)
31Each state has 8 dierent types. Eleven states are included in this model. Two states, Alaska and
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total number of observation is therefore 440. These observations are used for this synthetic panel
data model32.
The econometric equation is
CARELESSit = Xit + PRIMARYit + ci + "it; i = 1; :::; 88 and t = 2003; :::; 2007
(2)
where, i is a type and t is a year. Xit includes independent variables that are used to group
drivers. The summary statistics are presented in Table 11. Table 11-a uses the panel data from
the states that change the laws, while Table 11-b uses it from their neighboring states that do not
change them. I call the former primary data and the latter non-primary data. From the primary
data, the average of CARELESS is 18 percent. Thus, on average, there are about 1.8 careless
drivers out of 10 drivers in each cohort. Between the primary and non-primary data, there is
no dierence in drivers' careless behavior (.1800 vs. .1853.). The main independent variable,
PRIMARY , is a dummy variable. Therefore, if all drivers in a group have accidents before the
seat belt law is adopted at a particular year, then the value is zero. Otherwise, it is one. Slightly
less than 30 percent of the observations have the value of zero. All other independent variables
are dummy variables because they are used to construct the panel data.
Both estimation results are presented to compare. If the osetting eects existed, then the
coecient of the variable, PRIMARY , would be positive and statistically signicant only in the
estimation model that uses the primary data (Table 11-a).
The estimation results are presented in Table 1233. The random eect models are used.
Maine, are dropped because of econometric issue. Both states have very few accidents in the original data
set. If I grouped them into several cohorts, then the number of observations each cohort would be very
small. The synthetic panel data model results in measurement errors if the size of each cohort is too small.
32There is a trade-o between the pooled probit and the panel models in terms of econometric benets.
To ameliorate individual unobserved heterogeneity that changes over time, the panel model is more desired.
However, there is no panel data. The only way is to construct the synthetic panel model, which may result
in another problem. Not all the independent variables used in the bivariate probit model can be used.
This, we can't control for these within the model. Only the variables that are used to make cohorts should
be used. If other variables were used, by calculating their group averages, then the measurement error
problem would arise.
33Since these results are used only as a robust test for the main model, it is enough to show the relationship
between primary seat belt laws and careless driving behavior.
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The rst synthetic panel model shows the estimation results from the states where their laws have
been changed. The second model shows the estimation results from the neighboring states. The
rst model shows that drivers in a state drive more carefully when a primary seat belt law is
in eect in the state. The coecient of the variable, PRIMARY , is highly signicant at the 1
percent level. This result is consistent with the main estimation result from the bivariate probit
model(Table 6). When a state adopts a more stringent seat belt law, the ratio of careless drivers
decreases by 19 percent. The t of this model is fairly good, with an R2 close to 40 percent. The
second synthetic panel model shows that the coecient is not statistically signicant at any level.
This is for the same reason: The neighboring states have not changed the laws over the periods
of study.
Individual characteristics are not statistically signicant. This result is also consistent
with the estimation results from the pooled probit model. The only dierence is year dummies.
They are not statistically signicant in the probit model, but they are signicant in the panel
model. This implies that the bivariate probit model fails to control for unobserved factors that
change over time and aect the dependent variable. As long as pooled cross-sectional data is
used, this is inevitable. The main disadvantage of the synthetic panel model, however, is that
many environmental factors that are used in the probit model are not controlled for anymore.
Thus, both models (the bivariate probit and synthetic panel models) have their own pros and
cons. However, the bivariate probit model in this paper is estimated using the robust variance
estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation. Therefore, even though the model does not
control for unobserved factors well, there is a consistent result from both models.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the eects of the primary seat belt laws on driver behavior and the
involvement of non-occupants. I nd that the osetting eects do not exist when I analyze the
accidents using all injury levels. Primary seat belt laws rather reduce the predicted probability
of less careful driving behavior. The behavior does not even lead to greater involvement of non-
occupants. Therefore, the overall eect of the laws is still eective, assuming that the law reduces
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the fatality of drivers and passengers34.
The sensitivity analysis shows that the primary seat belt law is one of the main deter-
minants for the involvement of non-occupants via the change in drivers' driving behavior. Such
behavioral pattern has not been observed in the neighboring states. Therefore, the coecient of
the variable, PRIMARY , is not mixed with other unobservable factors. Regarding the possible
lagged behavior, the eect of the primary seat belt laws on the non-occupant involvement is im-
mediate and shows some delayed eects. The estimation results from the synthetic panel model
also show consistent outcomes. Both bivariate probit and the synthetic panel data models show
that drivers are more careful because of the stringent law enforcement. I can also conclude that
there is no presence of the osetting eects from the seat belt laws.
Currently, 31 states and the District of Columbia adopt the primary seat belt law. Nineteen
states still have secondary laws, and New Hampshire has no seat belt law. Some people argue
that drivers should choose to wear seat belts as a matter of \personal freedom."35 However, the
primary seat belt laws save the lives of drivers as well as passengers, pedestrians, and bikers. This
result, combined with earlier studies, shows that the primary seat belt laws play an important
role in improving public safety on the U.S. roads36.
It is still true that the laws save drivers' lives. As of Jan. 1, 2010, a new state law in
Georgia, `Super Speeder Law', went into eect with substantially higher nes, $ 20037. This law
may give drivers stronger incentives to drive more carefully and strengthen the eects of primary
seat belt laws. Therefore, a punitive penalty, such as higher nes, would make the laws much
more eective, if used together.
For future studies, we may test if joint regulation were more eective in promoting pub-
lic safety. We can perform this test by comparing dierent states with and without punitive
(monetary) penalty, given that the states have the same level safety enforcement.
34A research note (2006) from the NHTSA found that states with primary enforcement laws have lower
fatality rates. According to the note, the passenger vehicle occupant fatality rates were 1.03 per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and 10.69 per 100,000 population over the period of study. This compares
to 1.21 and 13.13 (respectively) for all other states.
35For instance, the National Motorists Association(NMA) submitted testimony against a 2003 Wisconsin
bill allowing primary enforcement. Seven years later, the state of Wisconsin eventually passed a primary
seat belt law in 2009. See more details from \http://www.motorists.org/seat-belt-laws/testimony".
36Not only the seat belt laws improve public safety. Vehicle recall regulation reduces accidental harm.
See Bae & Bentez-Silva (2011a and 2011b) for more details.
37See \http://www.safespeedsgeorgia.org/".
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Another possible study can augment my paper. The use of cellular phones has been
prevalent in recent years in the U.S. Some states are beginning to prohibit drivers from using the
cellular phones to call or send text messages, while driving on highways. Cellular phone usage
could be a major distraction of careless driving behavior. My current paper does not incorporate
this into the model. Therefore, we could test if there is a relationship between primary seat belt
laws, laws banning cellular phones, and their joint impacts on road safety.
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Table 1. Primary Seat Belt Laws - States
State Initial Primary Standard Who is Covered? Maximum
Eective Seatbelt Enforcement In What Seats? Fine
Date Laws? Date 1st Oense
Alabama 07/18/91 Yes 12/09/99 15+ years in front seat $ 25
Alaska 09/12/90 Yes 05/01/06 16+ years in all seats $ 15
Arizona 01/01/91 No 15+ in front seat; 5 through 15 in all seats $ 10
Arkansas 07/15/91 Yes 06/03/09 15+ years in front seat $ 25
California 01/01/86 Yes 01/01/93 16+ years in all seats $ 20
Colorado 07/01/87 No 16+ years in front seat $ 15
Connecticut 01/01/86 Yes 01/01/86 7+ years in front seat $ 15
Delaware 01/01/92 Yes 06/30/03 16+ years in all seats $ 25
DC 12/12/85 Yes 10/01/97 16+ in all seats $ 50
Florida 07/01/86 Yes 06/30/09 6+ in front seat; 6 through 17 in all seats $ 30
Georgia 09/01/88 Yes 07/01/96 18+ in front seat; 6 through 17 in all seats $ 15
Hawaii 12/16/85 Yes 12/16/85 18+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats $ 45
Idaho 07/01/86 No 7+ years in all seats $ 10
Illinois 01/01/88 Yes 07/03/03 16+ in front seat; 18 and younger in all seats $ 25
if driver is younger than 18 years
Indiana 07/01/87 Yes 07/01/98 16+ years in all seats $ 25
Iowa 07/01/86 Yes 07/01/86 11+ years in front seat $ 25
Kansas 07/01/86 Yes 06/10/10 18+ in front seat; 14 through 17 in all seats $ 30
Kentucky 07/15/94 Yes 07/20/06 7+ years in all seats; 6 and younger and $ 25
more than 50 inches in all seats
Louisiana 07/01/86 Yes 01/01/95 13+ years in front seat $ 25
Maine 12/26/95 Yes 09/20/07 18+ years in all seats $ 50
Maryland 07/01/86 Yes 10/01/97 16+ years in front seat $ 25
Massachusetts 02/01/94 No 13+ years in all seats $ 25
Michigan 07/01/85 Yes 04/01/00 16+ years in front seat $ 25
Minnesota 08/01/86 Yes 06/09/09 all in front seat; 3 through 10 in all seats $ 25
Mississippi 07/01/94 Yes 05/27/06 7+ years in front seat $ 25
Missouri 09/28/85 No 16+ years in front seat $ 10
Montana 10/01/87 No 6+ years in all seats $ 20
Nebraska 01/01/93 No 18+ years in front seat $ 25
Nevada 07/01/87 No 6+ years in all seats $ 25
New Hampshire n/a No law No law No law
New Jersey 03/01/85 Yes 05/01/00 18+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats; $ 20
New Jersey 7 and younger and more than 80 pounds
New Mexico 01/01/86 Yes 01/01/86 18+ years in all seats $ 25
New York 12/01/84 Yes 12/01/84 16+ years in front seat $ 50
North Carolina 10/01/85 Yes 12/01/06 16+ years in all seats $ 25
North Dakota 07/14/94 No 18+ years in front seat $ 20
Ohio 05/06/86 No 15+ in front seat; 8 through 14 in all seats $ 30
Oklahoma 02/01/87 Yes 11/01/97 13+ years in front seat $ 20
Oregon 12/07/90 Yes 12/07/90 16+ years in all seats $ 90
Pennsylvania 11/23/87 No 18+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats $ 10
Rhode Island 06/18/91 No 18+ years in all seats $ 75
South Carolina 07/01/89 Yes 12/09/05 6+ in front seat; 6+ in rear seat with shoulder belt $ 25
South Dakota 01/01/95 No 18+ years in front seat $ 20
Tennessee 04/21/86 Yes 07/01/04 16+ years in front seat $ 50
Texas 09/01/85 Yes 09/01/85 17+ in front seat; 5 through 16 in all seats; $ 200
4 and younger and 36 in or more
Utah 04/28/86 No 16+ years in all seats $ 45
Vermont 01/01/94 No 16+ years in front seat $ 25
Virginia 01/01/88 No 16+ years in all seats $ 25
Washington 06/11/86 Yes 07/01/02 16+ years in all seats $ 124
West Virginia 09/01/93 No 8+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats; $ 25
Wisconsin 12/01/87 Yes 06/30/09 8+ years in all seats $ 10
Wyoming 06/08/89 No 9+ years in all seats $ 25
* Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), \http://www.iihs.org/laws/SafetyBeltUse.aspx#OR."
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Table 2. People Involved in Accidents in 13 States over the 5 Years
Person Type Freq Percent
Driver of a Motor Vehicle in Transport 59528 77.83
Passenger of a Motor Vehicle in Transport 15446 20.20
Occupant of of a Motor Vehicle Not in Transport 162 0.21
Occupant of of a Non-Motor Vehicle Transport Device 10 0.01
Pedestrian 846 1.11
Cyclist (Pedalcyclist) 463 0.61
Person in or on a Working Vehicle 10 0.01
Other or Unknown 16 0.02
Total 76481 100.00
Note : The data set comes from the GES.
Since the GES data are from a probability sample of police-reported trac crashes,
national estimates can be made from these data. Refer to \NASS GES Analytical
Users Manual, 1988 - 2007" regarding the methodology for this.
Table 3. Injury Severity of Individuals
All individuals Pedestrians & Cyclists
Severity level Frequency Percent Frequency Percent y
No injury 45622 59.65 13 0.99
Possible injury 10797 14.12 55 4.20
Non-incapacitating injury 10532 13.77 793 60.58
Incapacitating injury 6233 8.15 358 27.35
Fatal injury 772 1.00 80 6.11
Injured, Severity Unknown 190 0.25 8 0.61
Died Prior to Crash 4 0.00 0 0.00
Unknown if Injured 2331 3.05 2 0.15
Total 76481 100.00 1309 100.00
y All individuals involved.
Table 4. Non-Occupant Action with Fatal Injury
Non-Occupant Action Pedesrtians & Cyclists
Frequency Percent
No Action 15 18.75
Non-motorist vehicle operator 7 8.75
Darting or running into road 13 16.25
Improper Crossing of roadway or intersection (Jaywalking) 16 20.00
Jogging 2 2.50
Walking with or against trac 6 7.50
Playing, working, sitting, lying, standing, etc in roadway 7 8.75
Other or unknown action 14 17.50
Total 80 100.00
y All individuals involved.
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Table 5. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variables:
Careless Action 59528 .1343 .3410 0 1 CARELESS
Non-Occupants 59528 .0533 .2247 0 1 NON OCCUPANT
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 59528 .4549 .4980 0 1 PRIMARY
Primary Seat Belt Law (3 months) 59528 .4225 .4940 0 1 PRIMARY 3
Primary Seat Belt Law (6 months) 59528 0 1 PRIMARY 6
Age 59528 38.4737 16.3493 16 100 AGE
Sex 59528 .6133 .4870 0 1 MALE
Alcohol Consumption 59528 .1068 .3089 0 1 ALCOHOL
Hour of Crash 59528 .2062 .4046 0 1 NIGHT
Population Density 59528 .3611 .4803 0 1 HIGH POP
Road Condition 59528 .8017 .3987 0 1 DRY SURFACE
Weather Condition 59528 .8595 .3475 0 1 GOOD WEATHER
Light Condition 59528 .6492 .4772 0 1 LIGHT
Vintage 59528 7.1995 5.2277 0 73 V EHICLE AGE
Vintage Square 59528 79.1610 115.5438 0 5329 V EHICLE AGE SQ
Inter-State Highway 59528 .0923 .2895 0 1 HIGHWAY
Relation to Junction 59528 .0287 .1671 0 1 INTERCHANGE
Maximum Speed Limit 59528 40.9272 12.3881 0 75 SPEED LIM
Year Dummy 2003 59528 .1817 .3856 0 1 Y EAR 2003
Year Dummy 2004 59528 .1701 .3757 0 1 Y EAR 2004
Year Dummy 2005 59528 .1187 .3235 0 1 Y EAR 2005
Year Dummy 2006 59528 .1921 .3940 0 1 Y EAR 2006
Year Dummy 2007 59528 .3374 .4728 0 1 Y EAR 2007
State Dummy Alaska 59528 .0003 .0179 0 1 ALASKA
State Dummy Arkansas 59528 .0032 .0568 0 1 ARKANSAS
State Dummy Delaware 59528 .0032 .0561 0 1 DELARWARE
State Dummy Florida 59528 .2481 .4319 0 1 FLORIDA
State Dummy Illinois 59528 .1601 .3667 0 1 ILLINOIS
State Dummy Kentucky 59528 .0670 .2500 0 1 KENTUCKY
State Dummy Maine 59528 .0005 .0217 0 1 MAINE
State Dummy Minnesota 59528 .0058 .0758 0 1 MINNESOTA
State Dummy Mississippi 59528 .0086 .0921 0 1 MISSISSIPPI
State Dummy North Carolina 59528 .1978 .3983 0 1 NORTH CAROLINA
State Dummy South Carolina 59528 .0067 .0818 0 1 SOUTH CAROLINA
State Dummy Tennessee 59528 .1776 .3822 0 1 TENNESSEE
State Dummy Wisconsin 59528 .1212 .3263 0 1 WISCONSIN
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Table 6. Primary Seat Belt Law and Osetting Eects
Probit Model 1 Probit Model 2 Bivariate Probit Model
CARELESS CARELESS
PRIMARY -.4668 (.1804)*** -.4673 (.1846)**
AGE -.0006 (.0006) -.0006 (.0006)
MALE .0230 (.0147) .0234 (.0149)
ALCOHOL .1602 (.1731) .1644 (.1742)
NIGHT .2340 (.0929)** .2458 (.0921)***
HIGH POP -.1700 (.0468)*** -.1712 (.0479)***
DRY SURFACE -.2057 (.2192) -.2060 (.2170)
GOOD WEATHER .2714 (.1894) .2683 (.1831)
LIGHT .1452 (.0791)* .1520 (.0837)*
VEHICLE AGE -.0037 (.0102) -.0037 (.0099)
VEHICLE AGE SQ .0003 (.0003) .0003 (.0003)
HIGHWAY -.2974 (.1247)** -.3057 (.1284)**
INTERCHANGE .0902 (.0908) .0907 (.0931)
SPEED LIMIT .0109 (.0035)*** .0112 (.0037)***
YEAR 2003 -.0839 (.1635) -.0877 (.1666)
YEAR 2004 .4056 (.2621) .4042 (.2632)
YEAR 2005 .3728 (.2879) .3748 (.2880)
YEAR 2006 .0169 (.1699) .0114 (.1705)
ALASKA .5620 (.0934)*** .6106 (.0961)***
ARKANSAS .3846 (.0191)*** .3852 (.0197)***
DELAWARE .4500 (.1220)*** .4509 (.1246)***
FLORIDA -.0762 (.0319)** -.0871 (.0328)***
ILLINOIS .4157 (.1703)** .4180 (.1744)**
KENTUCKY .3353 (.0738)*** .3315 (.0765)***
MAINE .6700 (.0493)*** .6679 (.0506)***
MINNESOTA -.2447 (.0895)*** -.2506 (.0915)***
MISSISSIPPI .6982 (.0765)*** .6891 (.0776)***
NORTH CAROLINA .8014 (.0785)*** .7992 (.0793)***
SOUTH CAROLINA .7478 (.0696)*** .7475 (.0703)***
TENNESSEE .6297 (.1294)*** .6295 (.1312)***
WISCONSIN - -
Continued
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Table 6. Primary Seat Belt Law and Osetting Eects
Probit Model 1 Probit Model 2 Bivariate Probit Model
NON OCCUPANT NON OCCUPANT
CARELESS .0162 (.1051) .5705 (.2297)**
AGE .0004 (.0002)** .0005 (.0002)**
MALE .0253 (.0132)* .0236 (.0130)*
ALCOHOL .3781 (.1884)** .3567 (.1672)**
NIGHT -.3108 (.3333) -.3277 (.3271)
HIGH POP .4166 (.1757)** .4237 (.1743)**
DRY SURFACE .3805 (.1694)** .3942 (.1587)**
GOOD WEATHER -.1703 (.1198) -.1974 (.1258)
LIGHT -.5731 (.3455)* -.5783 (.3446)*
VEHICLE AGE -.0101 (.0091) -.0095 (.0088)
VEHICLE AGE SQ .0002 (.0005) .0001 (.0004)
HIGHWAY -.0242 (.3661) .0022 (.3609)
INTERCHANGE -.9255 (.5281)* -.9110 (.5061)*
SPEED LIMIT -.0342 (.0177)* -.0348 (.0176)**
YEAR 2003 .1497 (.1678) .1367 (.1730)
YEAR 2004 -.1107 (.1220) -.1589 (.1259)
YEAR 2005 .3252 (.2609) .2734 (.2494)
YEAR 2006 .2442 (.2515) .2352 (.2511)
ALASKA 1.2652 (.2524)*** 1.2278 (.2439)***
ARKANSAS .5779 (.1598)*** .5315 (.1478)***
DELAWARE .4351 (.1197)*** .4178 (.1085)***
FLORIDA 1.1646 (.2103)*** 1.1484 (.1999)***
ILLINOIS .2722 (.0417)*** .2718 (.0397)***
KENTUCKY -.3718 (.0714)*** -.3895 (.0732)***
MAINE .3123 (.0915)*** .2404 (.0822)***
MINNESOTA .3829 (.1366)*** .3951 (.1339)***
MISSISSIPPI .6004 (.2298)*** .5381 (.2166)**
NORTH CAROLINA .1091 (.1797) .0456 (.1640)
SOUTH CAROLINA .6059 (.1667)*** .5446 (.1516)***
TENNESSEE .4478 (.2498)* .4154 (.2402)*
WISCONSIN - -
NUM of OBS 59,528 59,528 59,528
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
Robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation is used.
Wald test of  = 0: 2(1) = 12:0355. Reject the null.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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Table 7. Osetting Eects with Sub-Sample: Striking vs. Non-Striking
Striking Non-striking
CARELESS CARELESS
PRIMARY -.4045 (.1884)** -.5533 (.1745)***
AGE -.0008 (.0006) -.0001 (.0007)
MALE .0177 (.0231) .0330 (.0233)
ALCOHOL .0617 (.1437) .2947 (.2162)
NIGHT .2025 (.1031)** .3142 (.0773)***
HIGH POP -.1326 (.0501)*** -.1964 (.0427)***
DRY SURFACE -.3606 (.2317) .1757 (.0558)***
GOOD WEATHER .4363 (.1882)** -.1212 (.0741)
LIGHT .1421 (.0762)* .1689 (.0914)*
VEHICLE AGE .0046 (.0074) -.0160 (.0129)
VEHICLE AGE SQ .0000 (.0002) .0006 (.0004)
HIGHWAY -.2705 (.1226)** -.2847 (.1303)**
INTERCHANGE .0832 (.1405) .0548 (.0733)
SPEED LIMIT .0130 (.0036)*** .0072 (.0032)**
YEAR 2003 -.0630 (.1629) -.1334 (.1818)
YEAR 2004 .4194 (.2121)** .3213 (.3182)
YEAR 2005 .3591 (.2373) .3892 (.3546)
YEAR 2006 -.0144 (.1567) .0571 (.1683)
ALASKA .6025 (.1076)*** .7079 (.1372)***
ARKANSAS .4765 (.0371)*** .2881 (.0409)***
DELAWARE .3334 (.1408)** .5529 (.1194)***
FLORIDA -.0739 (.0292)** -.1513 (.0407)***
ILLINOIS .3936 (.1617)** .4801 (.1979)**
KENTUCKY .3179 (.0578)*** .3488 (.1238)***
MAINE 1.3147 (.0919)*** -.2674 (.0562)***
MINNESOTA -.5376 (.0959)*** .2643 (.0386)***
MISSISSIPPI .5565 (.0816)*** .7994 (.1010)***
NORTH CAROLINA .7371 (.0743)*** .8723 (.0918)***
SOUTH CAROLINA .8363 (.0686)*** .6879 (.0750)***
TENNESSEE .4803 (.1341)*** .7903 (.1537)***
WISCONSIN - -
Continued
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Table 7. Osetting Eects with Sub-Sample: Striking vs. Non-Striking
Striking Non-striking
NON OCCUPANT NON OCCUPANT
CARELESS .6486 (.1883)*** .5357 (.2256)**
AGE .0018 (.0004)*** -.0012 (.0006)**
MALE .0319 (.0261) .0154 (.0136)
ALCOHOL .5386 (.1692)*** .1517 (.1711)
NIGHT -.4071 (.3334) -.2564 (.3354)
HIGH POP .3971 (.1695)** .4470 (.1809)**
DRY SURFACE .3515 (.1541)** .3858 (.1970)**
GOOD WEATHER -.0681 (.1759) -.3253 (.0941)***
LIGHT -.6760 (.3476)* -.4521 (.3334)
VEHICLE AGE .0021 (.0132) -.0203 (.0081)**
VEHICLE AGE SQ -.0002 (.0007) .0003 (.0004)
HIGHWAY -.2690 (.3028) .3033 (.4307)
INTERCHANGE -.9586 (.3945)** -.8965 (.6432)
SPEED LIMIT -.0322 (.0162)** -.0391 (.0182)**
YEAR 2003 .2216 (.2065) .0275 (.1437)
YEAR 2004 -.1899 (.1351) -.1386 (.1374)
YEAR 2005 .4283 (.2280)* .0790 (.2420)
YEAR 2006 .2936 (.2636) .1620 (.2267)
ALASKA .8720 (.0766)*** 1.4102 (.3313)***
ARKANSAS .4817 (.1317)*** .5359 (.1449)***
DELAWARE .6887 (.0995)*** -.2238 (.1374)
FLORIDA 1.2415 (.1779)*** 1.0643 (.2260)***
ILLINOIS .3045 (.0358)*** .2448 (.0551)***
KENTUCKY -.4339 (.0997)*** -.2674 (.0562)***
MAINE .6125 (.1208)*** -5.6038 (.2960)***
MINNESOTA .2967 (.1381)** .5176 (.1275)***
MISSISSIPPI .6181 (.2370)*** .4425 (.2045)**
NORTH CAROLINA .0641 (.1882) .0002 (.1473)
SOUTH CAROLINA .3938 (.1202)*** .6534 (.1899)***
TENNESSEE .4749 (.2179)** .3206 (.2655)
WISCONSIN - -
NUM of OBS 32,738 26,790
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
Robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation is used.
Wald test of  = 0: 2(1) = 20:0632 for the rst sub-sample. Reject the null.
2(1) = 13:8942 for the second sub-sample. Also reject the null.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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Table 8. Fatality Rate Per 100 Million VMT
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ALASKA 1.74 2.30 1.89 1.82 1.98 2.02 1.45 (1.49) 1.59 1.27
ARKANSAS 2.07 2.24 2.08 2.13 2.09 2.22 2.05 2.01 1.96 1.81
DELAWARE 1.18 1.49 1.58 1.40 (1.57) 1.44 1.40 1.57 1.23 1.35
FLORIDA 2.06 1.99 1.77 1.76 1.71 1.65 1.75 1.65 1.56 1.50
ILLINOIS 1.42 1.38 1.37 1.35 (1.36) 1.24 1.27 1.17 1.16 0.98
KENTUCKY 1.75 1.75 1.83 1.95 1.99 2.04 2.08 (1.91) 1.80 1.74
MAINE 1.28 1.19 1.33 1.47 1.39 1.30 1.13 1.25 (1.22) 1.06
MINNESOTA 1.22 1.19 1.06 1.20 1.18 1.00 0.98 0.87 0.89 0.78
MISSISSIPPI 2.66 2.67 2.18 2.43 2.33 2.28 2.32 (2.20) 2.04 1.79
NORTH CAROLINA 1.71 1.74 1.67 1.70 1.66 1.64 1.53 (1.53) 1.62 1.40
SOUTH CAROLINA 2.41 2.34 2.27 2.23 2.01 2.11 (2.21) 2.08 2.11 1.86
TENNESSEE 2.01 1.99 1.85 1.73 1.73 (1.89) 1.79 1.82 1.70 1.50
WISCONSIN 1.31 1.40 1.33 1.37 1.42 1.31 1.36 1.22 1.27 1.05
y Parentheses show the fatality rate of the year when the law began its enforcement.
z http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx
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Table 9. Osetting Eects with 3 Month- and 6 Month-Time Lag
Bivariate Probit Model 1 Bivariate Probit Model 2
CARELESS CARELESS
PRIMARY -.4272 (.1236)*** -.6710 (.2618)**
AGE -.0006 (.0006) -.0005 (.0006)
MALE .0226 (.0146) .0229 (.0151)
ALCOHOL .1605 (.1776) .0903 (.1271)
NIGHT .2849 (.1157)** .2796 (.1138)**
HIGH POP -.1567 (.0480)*** -.1585 (.0455)***
DRY SURFACE -.2170 (.2097) -.2214 (.2182)
GOOD WEATHER .2971 (.1715)* .2783 (.1849)
LIGHT .1966 (.0988)** .2317 (.0819)***
VEHICLE AGE -.0040 (.0096) -.0014 (.0081)
VEHICLE AGE SQ .0003 (.0003) .0002 (.0003)
HIGHWAY -.3025 (.1298)** -.2900 (.1259)**
INTERCHANGE .0689 (.0968) .0692 (.0866)
SPEED LIMIT .0110 (.0038)*** .0101 (.0040)**
ALASKA .1406 (.0880) -.0301 (.1736)
ARKANSAS .3829 (.0208)*** .3885 (.0185)***
DELAWARE -.0202 (.0785) -.0955 (.0646)
FLORIDA -.0976 (.0295)*** -.1024 (.0311)***
ILLINOIS -.0701 (.0249)*** -.1798 (.0744)**
KENTUCKY -.1212 (.0955) -.3567 (.2152)*
MAINE .2347 (.1479) -.0214 (.2397)
MINNESOTA -.2596 (.0827)*** -.2341 (.0628)***
MISSISSIPPI .2367 (.0762)*** .0762 (.1617)
NORTH CAROLINA .2984 (.1107)*** .0919 (.1853)
SOUTH CAROLINA .2969 (.0948)*** .1578 (.1019)
TENNESSEE .1696 (.0635)*** .0485 (.0637)
NON OCCUPANT NON OCCUPANT
CARELESS .5995 (.1975)*** .3236 (.4282)
AGE .0005 (.0002)** .0005 (.0002)**
MALE .0234 (.0129)* .0243 (.0133)*
ALCOHOL .3551 (.1648)** .3682 (.1870)**
NIGHT -.3299 (.3250) -.3240 (.3360)
HIGH POP .4237 (.1742)** .4221 (.1787)**
DRY SURFACE .3932 (.1594)** .3882 (.1607)**
GOOD WEATHER -.1957 (.1256) -.1842 (.1270)
LIGHT -.5804 (.3440)* -.5796 (.3474)*
VEHICLE AGE -.0095 (.0088) -.0099 (.0090)
VEHICLE AGE SQ .0001 (.0004) .0002 (.0004)
HIGHWAY .0030 (.3592) -.0099 (.3758)
INTERCHANGE -.9217 (.5167)* -.9243 (.5200)*
SPEED LIMIT -.0347 (.0176)** -.0346 (.0179)*
ALASKA 1.2258 (.2462)*** 1.2451 (.2447)***
ARKANSAS .5287 (.1512)*** .5521 (.1422)***
DELAWARE .4133 (.1092)*** .4252 (.1095)***
FLORIDA 1.1469 (.2012)*** 1.1588 (.2009)***
ILLINOIS .2717 (.0394)*** .2722 (.0401)***
KENTUCKY -.3887 (.0718)*** -.3819 (.0766)***
MAINE .2343 (.0878)*** .2662 (.0726)***
MINNESOTA .3956 (.1325)*** .3917 (.1391)***
MISSISSIPPI .5341 (.2217)** .5678 (.2044)***
NORTH CAROLINA .0426 (.1668) .0721 (.1554)
SOUTH CAROLINA .5406 (.1564)*** .5708 (.1431)***
TENNESSEE .4126 (.2433)* .4302 (.2348)*
NUM of OBS 59,528 59,528
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
Robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation is used.
Year dummies are not shown.
Wald tests of  = 0: 2(1) = 20:6588. 2(1) = :8401 Reject only the rst null.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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Table 10. Osetting Eects with Only Neighboring States
Probit Model 1 Probit Model 2 Bivariate Probit Model
CARELESS CARELESS
PRIMARY .4391 (.2584)* .4392 (.2586)*
AGE -.0002 (.0005) .0002 (.0005)
MALE .0129 (.0108) .0128 (.0109)
ALCOHOL -.0708 (.0690) -.0710 (.0689)
NIGHT .1191 (.0675)* .1184 (.0681)*
HIGH POP -.0207 (.1170) -.0207 (.1169)
DRY SURFACE -.0827 (.2851) -.0822 (.2867)
GOOD WEATHER -.1280 (.2568) -.1283 (.2578)
LIGHT .2190 (.0666)*** .2183 (.0670)***
VEHICLE AGE .0041 (.0036) .0041 (.0036)
VEHICLE AGE SQ -.0001 (.0001) -.0001 (.0001)
HIGHWAY -.3512 (.0630)*** -.3507 (.0635)***
INTERCHANGE .0027 (.1115) .0027 (.1115)
SPEED LIMIT .0133 (.0062)** .0132 (.0062)**
YEAR 2003 .5469 (.3299)* .5477 (.3318)*
YEAR 2004 .6051 (.2667)** .6055 (.2673)**
YEAR 2005 .7093 (.3852)* .7098 (.3853)*
YEAR 2006 .1024 (.1601) .1031 (.1616)
HAWAII .2445 (.1388)* .2460 (.1373)*
ARKANSAS .3521 (.0468)*** .3518 (.0474)***
MARYLAND .7312 (.2600)*** .7313 (.2598)***
FLORIDA -.0553 (.0308)* -.0548 (.0130)*
INDIANA -.6816 (.2561)*** -.6816 (.2561)***
OHIO -.5410 (.0928)*** -.5405 (.0925)***
NEW HAMPSHIRE .4286 (.0494)*** .4287 (.0495)***
MINNESOTA -.2006 (.0700)*** -.1999 (.0702)***
MISSOURI .0502 (.1215) .0505 (.1211)
VIRGINIA .2542 (.0776)*** .2544 (.0773)***
GEORGIA .1976 (.1559) .1978 (.1557)
ALABAMA .2461 (.2171) .2473 (.2166)
WISCONSIN -
Continued
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Table 10. Osetting Eects with Only Neighboring States
Probit Model 1 Probit Model 2 Bivariate Probit Model
NON OCCUPANT NON OCCUPANT
CARELESS -.1807 (.1099) -.2359 (.2627)
AGE -.0009 (.0006) -.0009 (.0006)
MALE .0227 (.0111)** .0228 (.0112)**
ALCOHOL .4963 (.2478)** .4955 (.2465)**
NIGHT -.0079 (.3368) -.0070 (.3402)
HIGH POP .2187 (.2513) .2183 (.2525)
DRY SURFACE 1.2206 (.3431)*** 1.2195 (.3445)***
GOOD WEATHER -.9153 (.3680)** -.9171 (.3668)**
LIGHT -.4776 (.3115) -.4753 (.3198)
VEHICLE AGE .0024 (.0050) .0024 (.0051)
VEHICLE AGE SQ -.0002 (.0002) -.0002 (.0002)
HIGHWAY .4980 (.3061) .4935 (.3130)
INTERCHANGE -.8117 (.3384)** -.8107 (.3395)**
SPEED LIMIT -.0618 (.0185)*** -.0617 (.0185)***
YEAR 2003 -.0326 (.3001) -.0286 (.2851)
YEAR 2004 -.1944 (.1724) -.1894 (.1545)
YEAR 2005 .1242 (.1415) .1312 (.1228)
YEAR 2006 .1318 (.2865) .1323 (.2841)
HAWAII .0686 (.1052) .0738 (.0990)
ARKANSAS .8418 (.2057)*** .8459 (.2062)***
MARYLAND .3881 (.1268)*** .4061 (.1136)***
FLORIDA 1.1858 (.1924)*** 1.1859 (.1928)***
INDIANA -.1251 (.0630)** -.1264 (.0620)**
OHIO .4936 (.1408)*** .4908 (.1501)***
NEW HAMPSHIRE .1176 (.0499)** .1224 (.0333)***
MINNESOTA .4476 (.0911)*** .4460 (.0938)***
MISSOURI .3115 (.1291)** .3138 (.1252)**
VIRGINIA .4083 (.1431)*** .4124 (.1372)***
GEORGIA .6640 (.1710)*** .6687 (.1646)***
ALABAMA .9726 (.2794)*** .9792 (.2571)***
WISCONSIN - -
NUM of OBS 88,630 88,630 88,630
Note : Standard errors are in parentheses.
Robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation is used.
Wald test of  = 0: 2(1) = :0679. Cannot Reject the null.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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Table 11-a. Summary Statistics - Synthetic Panel Model(Primary Group)
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variable:
Careless Action 437 .1800 .1787 0 1 CARELESS
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 440 .2909 .4547 0 1 PRIMARY
Sex 440 .5 .5006 0 1 MALE
Age between 16 and 25 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 1
Age between 26 and 35 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 2
Age between 36 and 49 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 3
Age over 50 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 4
Year Dummy 2003 440 .2 .4005 0 1 Y EAR 2003
...
Year Dummy 2007 440 .2 .4005 0 1 Y EAR 2007
State Dummy Arkansas 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 ARKANSAS
State Dummy Delaware 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 DELARWARE
State Dummy Florida 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 FLORIDA
State Dummy Illinois 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 ILLINOIS
State Dummy Kentucky 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 KENTUCKY
State Dummy Minnesota 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 MINNESOTA
State Dummy Mississippi 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 MISSISSIPPI
State Dummy North Carolina 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 NORTH CAROLINA
State Dummy South Carolina 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 SOUTH CAROLINA
State Dummy Tennessee 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 TENNESSEE
State Dummy Wisconsin 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 WISCONSIN
Table 11-b. Summary Statistics - Synthetic Panel Model (Non-Primary Group)
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variable:
Careless Action 440 .1853 .1883 0 .8642 CARELESS
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 440 .2909 .4547 0 1 PRIMARY
Sex 440 .5 .5006 0 1 MALE
Age between 16 and 25 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 1
Age between 26 and 35 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 2
Age between 36 and 49 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 3
Age over 50 440 .25 .4335 0 1 AGE 4
Year Dummy 2003 440 .2 .4005 0 1 Y EAR 2003
...
Year Dummy 2007 440 .2 .4005 0 1 Y EAR 2007
State Dummy Arkansas 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 ARKANSAS
State Dummy Maryland 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 MARY LAND
State Dummy Florida 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 FLORIDA
State Dummy Indiana 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 INDIANA
State Dummy Ohio 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 OHIO
State Dummy Minnesota 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 MINNESOTA
State Dummy Missouri 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 MISSOURI
State Dummy Virginia 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 V IRGINIA
State Dummy Georgia 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 GEORGIA
State Dummy Alabama 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 ALABAMA
State Dummy Wisconsin 440 .0909 .2878 0 1 WISCONSIN
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Table 12. Synthetic Panel Data Model
Synthetic Panel Model 1 Synthetic Panel Model 2
CARELESS CARELESS
PRIMARY -.1945 (.0276)*** -.0379 (.0251)
MALE .0109 (.0135) .0093 (.0127)
AGE 1 .0264 (.0190) .0214 (.0180)
AGE 2 .0049 (.0195) .0154 (.0185)
AGE 3 .0160 (.0197) .0105 (.0178)
YEAR 2003 -.0620 (.0224)*** .0577 (.0232)**
YEAR 2004 .0762 (.0215)*** .1010 (.0191)***
YEAR 2005 .0654 (.0219)*** .1236 (.0272)***
YEAR 2006 -.0456 (.0173)*** .0055 (.0198)
ARKANSAS .0655 (.0273)** .0655 (.0264)**
DELAWARE .1759 (.0340)*** -
MARYLAND - .3902 (.0321)***
FLORIDA .0587 (.0242)** .0587 (.0241)**
ILLINOIS .1544 (.0309)*** -
INDIANA - -.0088 (.0241)
KENTUCKY .1104 (.0198)*** -
OHIO - -.0239 (.0161)
MINNESOTA .0010 (.0236) .0013 (.0238)
MISSISSIPPI .2408 (.0352)*** -
MISSOURI - .0561 (.0204)***
NORTH CAROLINA .2277 (.0164)*** -
VIRGINIA - .1057 (.0120)***
SOUTH CAROLINA .2253 (.0325)*** -
GEORGIA - .1217 (.0267)***
TENNESSEE .2725 (.0418)*** -
ALABAMA - .3250 (.0347)***
Num. of Obs. 437 440
Num. of Groups 88 88
R2:within 0.2894 .1633
R2:between 0.7981 .9308
R2:overall 0.4037 .5229
Note : Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Two states, Alaska and Maine, are not used for this estimation
because the number of observations in each cohort is too small.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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APPENDIX A. Description of Variables
Variable Description Dummy
Dependent variables:
CARELESS x Careless driving behavior: Y
1 if the driver shows careless driving behavior, 0 otherwise
NON OCCUPANT Non-occupants' involvement Y
1 if non-occupants are involved, 0 otherwise
Independent Variables:
PRIMARY x Primary seat belt law: 1 if an accident occurs Y
in the state with the law, 0 if otherwise
PRIMARY 3 Primary seat belt law: 1 if an accident occurs Y
after 3 months since the adoption, 0 if otherwise
PRIMARY 6 Primary seat belt law: 1 if an accident occurs Y
after 6 months since the adoption, 0 if otherwise
AGE Age of the person (years) Y
AGE 1 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is between 16 and 25 Y
AGE 2 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is between 26 and 35 Y
AGE 3 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is between 36 and 49 Y
AGE 4 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is over 50 Y
MALE x Gender: 1 if male, 0 if female Y
ALCOHOL Police-reported alcohol involvement in accidents Y
1 if the person had consumed an alcoholic beverage, 0 if not
NIGHT Hour of crash Y
1 if accident occurs between 7:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. Y
HIGH POP Population Density: Y
1 if within area of population of 100,000 +, 0 if less than 100,000
DRY SURFACE 1 if condition of road surface at the time of crash is dry, 0 otherwise Y
GOOD WEATHER General weather conditions: Y
1 if it is good, 0 if there was any adverse condition Y
LIGHT General light conditions: 1 if daylight, 0 otherwise Y
V EHICLE AGE Dierence between the current year and the model year N
V EHICLE AGE SQ Square of V EHICLE AGE N
HIGHWAY Interstate Highway Y
1 if the crash occurred on an interstate highway, 0 otherwise
INTERCHANGE 1 if the rst harmful event is located Y
within an interchange area, 0 otherwise
SPEED LIMIT Actual posted speed limit (miles per hour) N
Y EAR 2003 x Year dummy Y
...
...
Y EAR 2007 x Year dummy Y
ALASKA x State dummy Y
...
...
WISCONSIN x State dummy Y
Note : x indicates that the denition of the variable is same in the synthetic panel data model.
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